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ABSTRACT
The Insanity Defense Reform Act (IDRA) was a
legislative response to the acquittal of John Hinckley
by reason of insanity.

Part of the motivation for this

legislation was to decrease the number of successful
insanity defense pleas in the federal courts by
changing who has the burden of proof from the
prosecution to the defense.

This study used mock

juries to examine whether there would be fewer
acquittals by reason of insanity under the IDRA than
there had been under the previous law.

This study also

investigated whether the jurors understood the pattern
jury instructions containing the applicable law.
Finally this study examined how the deliberation
process may have influenced individual decisions by
examining jurors responses before and after
deliberation.

One hundred thirty four students at the

College of William and Mary were shown a videotape of a
mock trial based on an actual trial involving the
insanity defense.

Before and after deliberation

subjects made determinations regarding the defendant's
guilt, their attitude towards the defendant's insanity
plea and completed a comprehension questionnaire.

Instructions consistent with the IDRA did not lead to
significantly more guilty jury verdicts, X2(3, N =134)
= 4.37, n.s., but after deliberation there were
significantly more not guilty by reason of insanity
verdicts when the burden was on the prosecution to
prove insanity beyond a reasonable doubt, X2(3, N =
134) = 12.44, p < .05.

Analysis of the subjects'

attitude towards the defendant's insanity plea
indicated that significantly more subjects believed the
defendant was less morally responsible for his behavior
when the burden was on the prosecution to prove sanity
beyond a reasonable doubt, F(1,127) = 4.30, p<.05.
Furthermore, when the burden was on the prosecution to
prove sanity beyond a reasonable doubt the subjects
more strongly endorsed the idea that the defendant
should be in a psychiatric hospital rather than a
prison in comparison to those subjects in the condition
requiring the defense to prove insanity beyond a
reasonable doubt, F(1,127) = 5.34, p<.05.

Jury

deliberation did not significantly impact the subjects'
attitude towards the defendant's insanity plea or
comprehension of the jury instructions.

The jurors had

particular difficulty comprehending the instructions

regarding who had the burden of proof when the burden
was on the prosecution to prove sanity.

This study did

not find that jury decisions were significantly
effected by the jury instructions, but the individual
juror's decisions regarding the verdicts after
deliberation did significantly differ depending upon
the instruction condition.

Also some of the individual

juror's attitudes towards the insanity plea were
significantly influenced by the instructions provided.
Juror comprehension of the pattern jury instructions
was impaired, particularly when the burden was on the
prosecution to prove sanity.
Kathleen Dring
Department of Psychology
The College of William and Mary in Virginia

CHANGES IMPLEMENTED PURSUANT TO THE
INSANITY DEFENSE REFORM ACT:
EFFECT ON TRIAL BY JURY OUTCOME
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Insanity Defense 2

Changes Implemented Pursuant to the
Insanity Defense Reform Act:
Effect on Trial by Jury Outcome
One of the underlying theories of the insanity
defense is based on the requirement that a crime
requires the joint operation of act and intent
(Handspike v. State. 1947).

One who is insane cannot

have the requisite mens rea (mental state) necessary to
be held responsible for the criminal act (Callahan,
Mayer & Steadman, 1987).

Another theory underlying the

insanity defense centers around the notion of free
will.

Criminal responsibility is assessed when a man

has free will and elects to do evil (U.S. v. Brawner.
1972).

A person who is insane at the time of the

criminal act is not punishable because he or she lacks
free will (Carter v. U.S.. 1957).
There have been five major attempts in the,U.S. to
determine the nature of criminal responsibility and the
types of conduct requisite for the insanity defense
(Simon & Aaronson, 1988).

The early foundations of the

insanity defense arose from the case of Daniel
M'Naghten (M'Naghten's Case. 1843).
M'Naghten suffered from what today may be
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described as delusions of persecution symptomatic of
paranoid schizophrenia (American Psychiatric
Association, 1983).

He shot an assistant to the prime

minister of England mistakenly believing the assistant
to be the prime minister.

At trial, the jury returned

a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity.
This verdict evoked angry reactions from the
public, parliament and Queen Victoria.

The reactions

resulted in the House of Lords requesting 15 common law
judges to account for this perceived miscarriage of
justice (Simon & Aaronson, 1988).

The response of

these judges has become known as the M'Naghten rule.
Under the M'Naghten rule the accused cannot be
convicted if at the time of the crime, the accused was
laboring under such a defect of reason from disease of
the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the
act he was doing, or that if he did know it, he did not
know what he was doing was yrong (Simon & Aaronson,
1988).
The M'Naghten rule was widely accepted in the
United States by 1851 and still remains the basis of
the insanity defense in many states (Callahan et al.,
1987).

Some courts have supplemented the M'Naghten

test with the concept of irresistible impulse.

This
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recognizes insanity as a defense when a mental disease
results in an impulse '*such as to override the reason
and judgement and obliterate the sense of right or
wrong to the extent that the accused is deprived of the
choice between right and wrong” (Smith v. U.S.. 1929,
p. 549).

Under the irresistible impulse standard, a

defendant can be acquitted of a crime if his or her
mental disease deprives the defendant of the will power
to resist an insane impulse, even though the defendant
knows the act is wrong.
In Durham v . U.S.

(1954), the Court of Appeals for

the District of Columbia rejected the M'Naghten rule
and substituted a broader test for insanity known as
the Durham rule.

This test provided that "an accused

is not criminally responsible if his unlawful act was
the product of a mental disease or defect"
U .S.. 1954, p. 859).

(Durham v.

This rule was devised to

facilitate expert testimony which was perceived to be
confined by the narrowly focused M'Naghten rule.

The

M'Naghten rule by focusing on the defendant's cognitive
impairment (i.e. ability to know right from wrong),
restricted

information medical experts could convey to

the judge and the jury about the defendant's total
mental functioning (U.S. v. Brawner, 1972).

The
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adoption of the Durham rule resulted in significant
increases in acquittals by reason of insanity in the
District of Columbia (Weiner 1980).

This rule did not

gain wide acceptance among other jurisdictions (Simon &
Aaronson, 1988).
In U.S. v. Brawner. 1972, the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia rejected the Durham rule and
adopted with minor modification, Section 4.01(1) of the
Model Penal Code of the American Law Institute (ALI).
This rule states as follows:
A person is not responsible for criminal conduct
if at the time of such conduct as a result of
mental disease or defect he lacks substantial
capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his
conduct or to conform his conduct to the
requirements of the law.
One of the reasons the court rejected the Durham
rule was that it resulted in undue dominance of the
medical expert.

This over-reliance on medical

testimony was caused by the Durham rule requirement
that the crime be a "product" of the mental disease.
The medical expert testimony was given in terms of a
non-medical construct ("product"), to express a
conclusion that included moral and legal concerns.

In
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Brawner v. U.S.. (1972) , the court commented on this
reason for rejecting the Durham rule as follows:
There is, indeed irony in a situation under which
the Durham rule, which was adopted in large part
to permit experts to testify in their own terms
concerning matters within their domain which the
jury should know, resulted in testimony by the
experts in terms not their own, to reflect
unexpressed judgments in a domain that is properly
not theirs but the jury's,

(p. 98 3)

The ALI rule was applicable in. all federal
jurisdictions and a majority of the states on March 30,
1981 when John Hinckley, Jr. attempted to assassinate
President Ronald Reagan as he left a hotel in
Washington D.C.

On June 21, 1982 a federal jury

acquitted Hinckley of 13 crimes by a verdict of "not
guilty by reason of insanity."

This verdict was a

catalyst for a wide range of reactions advocating
changes in the insanity defense laws.

The implicit

goal of many of these proposals was to decrease the
amount of acquittals by reason of insanity (Rogers,
1987).

The reactions evoked from this verdict has many

parallels to that which occurred subsequent to the
acquittal of Daniel M'Naghten (Rogers, 1987).
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Bonnie (1983), who was an influential witness at
the Congressional hearings on the insanity defense
subsequent to Hinckley's acquittal, had two primary
recommendations.

First, he recommended that the

volitional prong (i.e. "to conform his conduct to the
requirements of the law") be eliminated from the
insanity defense.

Bonnie reasoned that "there is no

scientific basis for measuring a person's capacity for
self-control or for calibrating the impairment of that
capacity." (p. 196).

Secondly, he proposed that the

burden of persuasion should be shifted from the
prosecution to the defense.
The U.S. Supreme Court in Davis v. U.S.. (1895)
established the rule applicable in federal courts
regarding which party has the burden of proof on the
insanity issue.

According to this rule, there is a

presumption of sanity at the time of the offense.

The

defendant must introduce some evidence of insanity at
the time of the crime.

Once this burden of going

forward with the evidence has been met, the presumption
of sanity has been rebutted, and the government then
carries the burden of persuasion to show beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant was sane at the
time of the crime (U.S. v. Brawner. 1972).
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This was the law applicable to Hinckley's case and
also was the source of much of the angry reaction
subsequent to his acquittal.

Shortly after the

verdict, members of the Hinckley jury were invited to
testify before a subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary
Committee.

Some of the jurors testified that the

judge's instructions on the burden of proof affected
their verdict (Simon & Aaronson, 1988).
The American Bar Association recommended that the
volitional prong of the insanity defense be eliminated
(Rogers, 1987). Their recommendation regarding burden
of proof hinged upon whether the ALI or M'Naghten test
for insanity is utilized.

In those jurisdictions using

the ALI test, the American Bar Association advocated
that the defendant should have the burden of proving by
a preponderance of the evidence that he/she was insane
at the time of the offense.

In those jurisdictions

using a M'Naghten rule, the American Bar Association
recommended that the prosecution should have the burden
of disproving the defendant's claim of insanity beyond
a reasonable doubt (Simon & Aaronson, 1988).
The American Psychiatric Association (1983)
proposed that the ALI standard be revised by
eliminating the volitional prong of the insanity
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defense and retain only the cognitive component (i.e.
"lacks substantial capacity to appreciate the
wrongfulness of his conduct").

The American

Psychiatric Association (1983) reasoned that
psychiatric testimony relevant to whether a defendant
understands the nature of his\her act has a more
scientific basis than testimony relevant to whether a
defendant was able to control his behavior.
Though declining to make a recommendation
regarding who should have the burden of proof, the
American Psychiatric Association (1983) did define the
issue as whether the rights of the state or the rights
of the individual are to be given more or less weight
in insanity trials

In citing Addington v. Texas, a

U.S. Supreme Court case in which the Court stated in
dicta that psychiatric evidence is usually not
sufficiently clear cut to prove many legal facts beyond
a reasonable doubt, the American Psychiatric
Association (1983) clearly framed this issue as one of
great import in insanity trials.

The American

Psychiatric Association (1983) stated as follows:
It is commonly believed that the likely effect of
assigning the burden of proof (burden of
persuasion) to the defendant rather than the state
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in insanity trials will be to decrease the number
of such successful defenses.

This matter clearly

requires further empirical study.

(p. 685)

The American Psychological Association was
critical of the reactions of the American Psychiatric
Association and the American Bar Association mainly on
the basis that there was insufficient empirical
evidence to make specific recommendations about the
insanity defense.

The American Psychological

Association urged restraint despite the public and
political pressure for immediate restructuring of the
insanity defense (Rogers, 1987).
In 1984 the United States Congress in a
significant legislative response to the Hinckley
verdict, enacted the Insanity Defense Reform Act, 18
U.S.C. Section 17 (IDRA).

This marked the first

federal codification of the insanity defense (Simon &
Aaronson, 1988).

(a)

The IDRA states as follows:

Affirmative defense- It is an affirmative

defense to a prosecution under any Federal statute
that, at the time of the commission of the acts
constituting the offense, the defendant as a
result of a severe mental disease, was unable to
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appreciate the nature and quality or the
wrongfulness of his act.

Mental disease or defect

does not otherwise constitute a defense.
(b)

Burden of proof- The defendant has the burden

of proving the defense of insanity by clear and
convincing evidence.
The IDRA differs from the ALI standard in several
ways.

First, it eliminates the volitional prong as was

recommended by the American Psychiatric Association and
the American Bar Association.

Second, the Act places

the burden on the defendant to prove insanity by clear
and convincing evidence.

Most states that place the

burden of proof on the defendant only require the
defendant to prove insanity by a preponderance of the
evidence (Simon & Aaronson, 1988).

This lesser burden

would have been consistent with the American Bar
Association's proposal.

Finally, the IDRA adopted a

more stringent cognitive standard (i.e. "unable to
appreciate" as opposed to "lacks substantial capacity
to appreciate"), for demonstrating insanity.
The constitutionality of placing the burden of
proof upon the defendant has been unsuccessfully
challenged (U.S. v. Amos. 1986;
1986).

U.S. v. Freeman.

In U.S. v. Amos. (1986), the Court of Appeals
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for the 8th Circuit held that the IDRA was not
violative of due process by shifting the burden of
proof to the defendant or by setting the standard for
the burden of proof at clear and convincing evidence
rather than preponderance of the evidence.

In Amos

(1986), the court relied on Leland v. Oregon. (1952),
in which the Supreme Court held an Oregon statute
constitutional that required the defendant to prove
insanity beyond a reasonable doubt.

In Leland (1952),

the Court ruled that the issue of insanity is separate
from the crime charged and as long as the prosecution
must prove each element of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt, the statute was not constitutionally
infirm.
The changes instituted by the IDRA were primarily
motivated to reduce the number of successful assertions
of the insanity defense (American Psychological
Association, 1987;
1987).

Callahan et al., 1987;

Dripps,

There has been little or no empirical

investigation as to how the IDRA has impacted trial by
jury outcomes and how this law has affected attitudes
toward a particular defendant's insanity plea.
Homant and Kennedy (1987) investigated the
variations in expert witnesses' judgments of insanity
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in a hypothetical case.

They found that a favorable

opinion of the defendant's insanity plea correlated
with being a psychiatrist, having a liberal ideology
and having received a neutral as opposed to a
sympathetic or

unsympathetic version of the case.

It

was also found in a post hoc analysis that an
association existed between experts residing in states
where the prosecution has the burden of proof to show
sanity and a favorable opinion of the defendant's
insanity plea.

Homant and Kennedy (1987) concluded

that their study lent support to the contention that
placing the burden of proof on the defense would reduce
the number of inappropriate insanity verdicts.
As exemplified by the testimony of the several
Hinckley jurors before a subcommittee of the Senate
Judiciary Committee, the jury instructions are a
crucial factor in any trial.

Improper jury

instructions Can be the basis for reversal of a trial
court decision (e.g. Wilson v. U.S.. 1914;
U.S.. 1950).

Billeci v.

Psychological research has indicated that

juror difficulties in comprehending instructions on the
law is considerable and widespread (Severance, Greene &
Loftus, 1984).

A concern of psychological research has

been to recognize jurors' difficulties in understanding
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the instructions and to use concepts of
psycholinguistics to construct instructions that are
both comprehensible and accurate reflections of the law
(e.g., Borgida & Park, 1988;
1977;

Elwork, Sales & Alfini,

Severance & Loftus, 1982;

Severance, Greene &

Loftus, 1984).
A common courtroom practice is the use of pattern
jury instructions.

Pattern jury instructions have been

devised to address the concern that inaccurate jury
instructions may give to rise to reversal on appeal.
Pattern instructions are standardized statements of the
law designed to be applicable generally to many cases
(Severance & Loftus, 1982).

These instructions are

generally designed by committees of judges and lawyers
to be routinely used in their jurisdictions (Severance,
Greene & Loftus, 1984).
Strawn and Buchanan (1976), found that subject
jurors who received oral pattern instructions only
showed slight improvement in comprehension of legal
issues as compared to subject jurors who received no
instructions.

Elwork, Sales and Alfini (1977),

examined pattern instructions pertaining to the law of
negligence and found no significant difference in
comprehension of negligence law between a group
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receiving pattern instructions and a group receiving no
instructions.

Similarly, comprehension of jury

instructions regarding the entrapment defense was found
to be poor because of the complexity of the language
used in the instruction (Borgida & Park, 1988).
Severance and Loftus (1982) found that one of the
common areas of juror misconception concerns the notion
of "reasonable doubt" as applied in the criminal law.
Juror subjects receiving pattern jury instructions did
not have significantly greater comprehension of
"reasonable doubt" than did those jurors receiving no
instructions.
A different result was found by Kerr, Atkin,
Stasser, Meek, Holt and Davis (1976), who examined the
concept of reasonable doubt as both an individual and a
group decision criteria.

The "reasonable doubt"

variable had three levels.

The first group of subjects

received no instructions and the other 2 groups of
subjects received reasonable doubt instructions of
varying stringency.

In the individual decision

condition those individuals who were given the more lax
definition of reasonable doubt rendered the highest
portion of guilty verdicts.

Those in the no

instruction condition gave proportionally more guilty
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verdicts than the stringent criteria group but less
than the lax criteria group.

One of the conclusions

reached in this study was that the concept of
reasonable doubt is not obvious to their sample of
college students (Kerr et al. 1976).

This is

consistent with Dane (1985) who concluded that the
concept of reasonable doubt is a difficult concept for
jurors to comprehend and to apply effectively in
rendering a decision.
Kagehiro (1990) reviewed research on juror
comprehension that compared definitions of three levels
of the standard of proof (preponderance of the
evidence, clear and convincing and beyond a reasonable
doubt).

She concluded that quantified definitions in

which the standard of proof is expressed in probability
terms and combined quantified and legal definitions had
their intended effect.

The number of favorable

plaintiff verdicts increased as the standard of proof
became stricter.

Definitions that did not use

quantified definitions did not have the intended
effect.
Other studies have examined the impact of jury
instructions on juror's decisions.

Cruse and Browne

(1987) found that the timing of instructions did not
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significantly effect the juror's reasoning or verdicts
but the frequency of the instructions influenced the
jurors use of legal rules in making their verdicts.
Greene (1988) evaluated the effectiveness of a
simplified instruction compared to a more
linguistically complicated instruction that is commonly
used in the courtroom to focus juror's attention on
eyewitness issues.

It was found that those jurors

hearing the revised instruction were more knowledgeable
of the existing factors to consider when evaluating
eyewitness testimony and were less likely to convict
the defendant.
Helgeson and Shaver (1990) demonstrated the
importance of examining the impact of jury instructions
in realistic settings.

In a series of three studies

involving a criminal indictment, an instruction
regarding the presumption of innocence, used to
alleviate a nonevidentiary bias (congruence between
crime and offender's occupation), was not effective in
eliminating the congruent effects when the trial
information was presented in a brief written format.
The congruence effect was alleviated when the
instructions were given in the context of a full trial.
Helgeson and Shaver (1990) concluded that experiments
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concerned with legal and social judgement processes
that do not incorporate realism into their design may
discover spurious biases that may not be found in
richer experimental environments.
Issues of external validity have been a major
concern in a variety of legal research areas.

One

particular area of concern is whether individual
judgments can be used to make conclusions about
group/jury judgments.

A discussion of the general

conceptual problems associated with extrapolating
research results from individual cognitive behavior to
social behavior has been discussed by Davis (1982).
Davis, Kameda, Parks, Stasson & Zimmerman (1989) note
that individual-to-group extrapolations can be flawed
when there is a failure to consider the contribution of
interpersonal interaction on group member opinion
change.

McGowen and King (1982) found that juries

render more moderate decisions than do individuals and
concluded that it is therefore important to consider
verdicts from juries rather than from isolated jurors.
These results were consistent with Izett and Leginiski
(1974) who found that for mock juries, post-discussion
verdicts were significantly more lenient than pre
discussion verdicts for an unattractive defendant.
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The finding that juries render more moderate
decisions than individuals should be considered with
other research on group decisions that has found that
groups tend to make decisions that are more extreme
than, but in the same direction as the initial
individual decisions (McGuire, Kiesler, & Siegel, 1987;
Kaplan, 1977).

Investigations of this group

polarization effect in mock jury situations has shown
that when decisions are made on a bipolar judgement
dimension, group discussion tends to move the average
of both the individual and group preferences toward the
pole that the prediscussion individual preference
favors (Kaplan & Miller, 1977; Kaplan & Miller,1978).
Polarization does not occur when equal sized and
equally opinionated factions are opposed (MacCoun,
1989).
One aspect of jury research that is not explained
by group polarization is the leniency effect that was
initially described by Kalven and Zeisel (1966).

The

leniency effect refers to the finding that not-guilty
majorities have greater power than guilty majorities in
establishing group-level consensus (Davis et al.,
1989).

Deliberation in mock jury studies generally

leads to greater leniency (Davis, Kerr, Stasser, Meek,&
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Holt, 1977; Kerr, 1981).

This leniency effect was even

observed when the jurors seemed to initially favor
conviction (Tanford & Penrod, 1986).
Spitzer, & Holt (1976) suggest that the leniency
effect is reflective of a "defendant protection norm".
MacCoun and Kerr (1988) found this effect when jurors
were given reasonable doubt instructions and not when
they heard the same case with preponderance of the
evidence instructions.

The reasonable doubt standard

may provide a rhetorical advantage for jurors favoring
acquittal during deliberation, and the effect of the
standard is magnified by group discussion

(MacCoun,

1989).
Mock jury research has also considered how group
members resolve initial differences and reach
consensus.

Deutsch and Gerard (1955) proposed two

processes of social influence in groups:
informational.

normative and

Normative influence is defined as

"influence to conform with the positive expectations of
another," and informational influence is defined as
"influence to accept information from another as
evidence of reality"

(p.629).

Kaplan and Miller (1983)

assert that informational influence may be the dominant
process when no consensus is needed, judgments are
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private, or fact finding is emphasized.

Normative

influence may be more likely when agreement is
required, judgments are publicly made, or social
concerns are emphasized.
Both of these processes are activated in jury
decision making (Stasser & Davis, 1981; Tanford &
Penrod, 1986).

Tanford and Penrod (1986) suggest that

to the extent that normative influence occurs in a
jury, verdicts should be a function of jurors' vote
preferences.

Informational influence should operate

through the content of deliberations.

Stasser and

Davis (1981) found that juror's stated verdict
preferences were predominantly influenced by normative
pressures, but certainty of their decision was
susceptible to informational influence.
decisions both processes occur.

In actual jury

There is often a

requirement of unanimity, so there is pressure for a
group consensus resulting in a normative influence.
Trials also call upon juries to be fact finders, so
there is an informational influence (Tanford & Penrod,
1986).
Mathematical models have been proposed to predict
group choice shifts from the initial individual
preferences to group consensus.

A model frequently
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used in mock jury research is the social decision
scheme proposed by Davis (197 3) .

This model maps the

likelihood of transitions from initial, predeliberation
conviction-to acquittal ratios in the group to final
group verdicts.

Research applying this theory has

consistently shown that the verdict preferred by a
clear majority of jurors at the outset of deliberation
is likely to be chosen as the group's final verdict
(MacCoun & Kerr, 1988).
The purpose of this study was to examine how the
changes implemented by the IDRA regarding who has the
burden of proof (i.e. prosecution or defense), and the
required level of the proof (beyond a reasonable doubt
or clear and convincing) will affect acquittal rates
and attitudes towards the defendant's insanity defense
in a hypothetical case.

Furthermore, given the

research indicating juror difficulty in understanding
jury instructions, this study investigated whether the
jurors would be able to recall and apply important
legal points relative to the insanity defense, after
they had been read the jury instructions.

Finally,

this research compared individual decisions regarding
the defendant's insanity plea before and after jury
deliberation.

Particular attention was given to the
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leniency effect and the majority decision scheme.
The first hypothesis of this study was that the
jury instruction consistent with the IDRA (i.e. burden
on the defendant, clear and convincing evidence), would
result in significantly fewer acquittals and would
result in the jurors having a less favorable attitude
towards the insanity defense than the jury instructions
consistent with the ALI rule (i.e. burden on the
prosecution, beyond a reasonable doubt).

Furthermore,

the more stringent standard of proof when the burden is
on the prosecution, would result in more juries and
jurors finding the defendant not guilty and having a
more favorable attitude towards the insanity plea as
presented.

The more stringent standard of proof when

the burden is on the defense, would result in more
juries and jurors finding the defendant guilty and
having a less favorable attitude towards the
defendant's insanity plea.

It was also, hypothesized

that the subjects would understand the jury
instructions and they would be able to properly apply
the law contained therein to the facts of the case as
presented.
Finally, this study hypothesized that the jury
deliberations would influence the individual decision

Insanity Defense 24
results as reflected by a difference between the pre
and post deliberation measures.

Furthermore, it was

hypothesized that the group final verdicts would
reflect the preference of a majority of the individual
jurors.
METHOD
Subjects
One hundred thirty four undergraduate students
over the age of 18 years from the College of William
and Mary participated in this study.

Each subject

received two hours of research credit for their
participation.

The subjects were solicited from sign

up sheets posted in the psychology building at the
College.

The sign-up sheets indicated that the purpose

of the study was to investigate the insanity defense
laws.
Materials
A hypothetical case derived from the transcript of
U.S. v . Amos (1986) was presented in videotape format.
A summary of the case presented to the mock jurors is
found in Appendix A.

U.S. v. Amos (1986) was a case

heard shortly after passage of the IDRA and was
unsuccessfully appealed by the defendant on the basis
that placing the burden of proving insanity by clear
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and convincing evidence upon the defendant was
unconstitutional.

It was one of the first reported

cases applying the IDRA.

It involved extensive

psychiatric testimony on the insanity issue.

The

government's expert witness, Dr. Park Dietz, had
testified in the Hinckley trial.
The research videotape was made in the Moot Court
Room at the Marsha11-Wythe School of Law.

The same one

hour videotape of the trial was shown to all of the
subjects.

The only variation in the videotape was in

the judge's instructions to the jury which corresponded
to the four treatment conditions in the study.

The

jury instructions were derived from the pattern jury
instructions commonly used in federal court (Appendix
B, Jury Instruction: Burden on Defense, Beyond a
Reasonable Doubt; Appendix C, Jury Instruction: Burden
on Defense, Clear and Convincing Evidence; Appendix D,
Jury Instruction: Burden on Prosecution, Beyond a
Reasonable Doubt; Appendix E, Jury Instruction: Burden
on Prosecution, Clear and Convincing Evidence).

The

attorneys on the videotape were actual attorneys
licensed to practice in Virginia and admitted to the
Federal Court for the Eastern District of Virginia.
The experts were played by psychology students in their
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first year of the Masters program at William and Mary.
The judge was also a psychology graduate student.

No

evidentiary matters were ruled upon by the judge and
her main function was to read the jury instructions and
to introduce aspects of the trial at transitional
points.
Each subject was presented with a questionnaire
(IDQ), after watching the videotape, designed to
measure their attitude towards the insanity defense
plea presented in the hypothetical case (Appendix F ) .
This questionnaire is a modification of that used by
Homant and Kennedy (1987).

The questionnaire consists

of six items and the subjects were asked to respond
with a number from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly
agree) for each item.

The lower the score on this

scale the greater the support for the defendant's
insanity plea.

Total scores possible on the measure

range from 6 to 30.
Also, each subject received a verdict form
(Appendix G ) , which asked the subject whether they
would find the defendant guilty or not guilty by reason
of insanity.

Actual juries in federal criminal trials

are presented with three options:

guilty, not guilty

and not guilty only by reason of insanity.

These
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versions were modified to prevent confusion.
Finally, a comprehension questionnaire was given
to each subject (Appendix H, Burden on Prosecution,
Beyond a Reasonable Doubt; Appendix I, Burden on
Prosecution, Clear and Convincing Evidence; Appendix J,
Burden on Defense, Clear and Convincing Evidence;
Appendix K Burden on Defense, Beyond a Reasonable
Doubt), to determine whether the subjects understood
the law as contained in the jury instructions.

This

was presented to the jurors after they had heard the
judge's instructions. Total scores possible on the
measure range from 0 to 7.
Also a group verdict form was given to each jury
on which they could indicate their group decision
(Appendix L ) .
Procedure
The testing sessions were conducted in classrooms
on the William and Mary campus.

The subjects were

tested in eight group sessions.

Each subject was

randomly assigned to one of the eight sessions.

Upon

arriving at the test session each subject was given a
consent form.
The subjects were then read instructions about the
study.

After the instructions were read the researcher
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answered questions that the subjects may have had.

The

instructions informed the subjects that they would be
watching a videotape of a reenactment of an actual
trial involving the insanity defense and that they
would be asked to render a verdict individually and in
a jury setting.

Those subjects willing to participate

were then asked to sign the consent form.

After

signing the consent form the participants were shown
the videotape.

After the videotape the subjects were

given a five minute break and they were instructed not
to discuss the case with anyone during the break.
Then the subjects, in groups of 4-6, were shown
the judge reading one set of the jury instructions.
There were four different jury instructions (burden on
prosecution, beyond a reasonable doubt; burden on
prosecution, clear and convincing; burden on defense,
beyond a reasonable doubt; burden on defense, clear and
convincing).

These instructions are presented in

Appendices H through K. The reading of the instructions
took approximately seven minutes.

After hearing the

instructions the subjects completed the individual
verdict forms, the comprehension questionnaire and the
IDQ.

Subjects were then assigned to juries randomly.
Each test session consisted of 15 to 18 people.
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Attempts were made to have 6 person juries but this was
not always possible due to some subjects not arriving
for their test session.

The jurors were instructed

that they were to try and come to a unanimous decision
regarding the defendant's insanity plea.

If they could

not come to a unanimous decision within 2 0 minutes they
were informed that their jury would be considered

a

hung jury.
The deliberations took place in the Social
Psychology laboratory.
room.

Each jury had their own private

One person on each jury panel was asked to

record the group's decision on the verdict form.
After returning to the classroom from deliberation
the subjects were then given the same comprehension and
attitude questionnaire they completed initially.

They

also completed another verdict questionnaire asking
them whether they changed their vote in the
deliberation process (Appendix M ) .

The subjects were

then thanked for their participation.
Results
Comparisons between the four jury instruction
conditions showed that instructions regarding who has
the burden of proof and the level of that burden did
not significantly effect group jury verdicts.

A chi-
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square analysis in which hung juries were grouped with
not guilty verdicts, indicated that the four jury
instructions did not significantly effect jury
verdicts, X2(3, N = 24) = 4.44, n.s.

Table 1 presents

the distribution of jury verdicts for each instruction
condition.

Insert Table 1 about here

Prior to jury deliberation, the individual
verdicts did not differ depending on the instruction
condition, X2(3, N =134) = 4 . 3 7 , n.s.

After

deliberation there was a significant difference between
the individual verdicts by instruction, X2(3, N, = 134)
= 12.44, p < .05.

There were significantly more not

guilty by reason of insanity verdicts when the burden
was on the prosecution to prove insanity beyond a
reasonable doubt.

Table 2 presents the frequency

distribution for individual verdicts before and after
deliberation by instruction.

Insert Table 2 about here

A

2 (level of proof) x 2 (burden of proof)
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repeated measure analysis of variance was performed,
with the repeated measure on each item of the IDQ
before and after deliberation, to assess whether there
were differences between the groups on the IDQ.

Table

3 presents the F ratios for each question on the IDQ.

Insert Table 3 about here

On IDQ(1) there was a significant between subjects
burden x level interaction, F(l, 127) = 4.30, p<.05.
When the burden was on the prosecution to prove sanity
beyond a reasonable doubt the subjects indicated that
the defendant was less morally responsible for his
behavior than when the burden was on the defense to
prove insanity beyond a reasonable doubt.

Figure 1

presents this interaction.

Insert Figure 1 about here

On IDQ(2) there was a significant time (before or
after deliberation) x level interaction, F(l,127) =
5.22, p < .05.

When the burden was clear and convincing

the subjects showed greater endorsement of the
statement "the defendant should be sentenced to prison

Insanity Defense
for a long time" after deliberation, but when the
burden was beyond a reasonable doubt the subjects
showed less endorsement of this statement after
deliberation.,

Figure 2 presents this interaction.
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Insert Figure 2 about here

On IDQ(3) there was a significant difference
between the groups depending on whether the level of
proof was clear and convincing or beyond a reasonable
doubt, F(1,127) = 5.47, p<.05.

When the level of proof

was clear and convincing the subjects indicated that
the defendant's behavior showed less probability of
insanity (M = 4.02), than when the burden of proof was
beyond a reasonable doubt (M = 3.65).
On IDQ(4) and IDQ(5) there were no significant
differences between the groups either before or after
deliberation.

Refer to Table 3 for the relevant F

ratios.
On IDQ(6) there was a significant level x burden
between subjects interaction, F(l,127) = 5 . 3 4 , p<.05.
Figure 2 presents the mean score on IDQ(6) as a
function of level of proof and burden of proof.

Insert Figure 3 about here

When the burden is on the prosecution to prove sanity
beyond a reasonable doubt the subjects more strongly
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endorse the idea that the defendant should be in a
hospital rather than a prison in comparison to those
subjects in the condition requiring the defense to
prove insanity beyond a reasonable doubt.

Table 4

presents the mean scores on each item of the IDQ before
and after deliberation by instruction.

Insert Table 4 about here

A 2 (level of proof) x 2 (burden of proof)
repeated measure of analysis of variance, with the
individual jurors total correct answers on the
comprehension questionnaire as the repeated measure,
showed no significant differences before deliberation,
F (20, 110) = 1.07, n.s., or after deliberation, F(20,
110) = .94, n.s.

Table 5 presents the mean number of

correct answers on the comprehension questionnaire
before and after deliberation.

Insert Table 5 about here

Each item on the comprehension questionnaire
completed prior to deliberation was analyzed to
determine if there was a difference between the
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instruction conditions in terms of whether the subjects
answered an item correctly or incorrectly.

On items 1,

2, 3, 4, 5, and 7 there were no significant differences
between the instruction conditions on the number of
correctly answered items.
were as follows:

The results for each item

Item 1-X2(3, N = 134) = 1.33, n.s.;

Item 2—X 2 (3, N = 134) = 2.54, n.s.; Item 3-X2(3, N =
.78, n.s.; Item 4-X2(3, N = 6.23, n.s.; Item 5-X2(3, N
= 134) = 2.57, n.s.; Item 7-X2(3, N = 134) = 5.35, n.s.
On item 6, which elicited information about who
has the burden to prove sanity/insanity, there was a
significant difference between the instruction groups
on the number of correct answers
P < .05.

X2(3, N =134) =12.44,

When the burden was on the prosecution to prove

sanity beyond a reasonable doubt significantly fewer
subjects indicated this burden correctly.

The

distribution of the correct and incorrect answers on
item 6 by instruction is provided in Table 6.

Insert Table 6 about here

Note in Table 6 that when the burden was on the
prosecution only 16 out of 67 (85%) subjects correctly
stated that the burden was on the defense.

When the
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burden was on the prosecution and the subjects
correctly answered that the burden was on the
prosecution 10/16 or 62% of them found the defendant
guilty.

When the burden was on the defense and the

subjects correctly answered that the burden was on the
defense 50/57 or 87% found the defendant guilty.
In order to assess whether the group deliberation
process influenced individual decisions on the IDQ a 4
(instruction) x 6 (jury nested within instruction) x 2
(level of proof) x 2 (burden of proof) analysis of
covariance, with the score on each item of the IDQ and
the total score on the IDQ before deliberation being
the covariate, was performed.

Table 7 presents the

results indicating that group deliberation did not
significantly impact the subjects attitude towards the
defendant's insanity plea.

Insert Table 7 about here

A similar analysis was performed to determine if
the deliberation process significantly effected the
total scores on the comprehension questionnaire.

The

were no significant effects for the level of proof,
F (1, 107) = .42, n.s.: for burden of proof, F(l, 107) =
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.70, n.s. or for the interaction between level and
burden of proof, F(l, 107) = .10, n.s.
Discussion
The jury instructions regarding who has the burden
of proof and the level of that proof did not effect
jury verdicts.

But this finding alone is insufficient

to conclude that the IDRA will not lead to fewer
successful insanity defense pleas than was found under
the prior law.

The reason for the reluctance to draw

such a conclusion is based on the fact that the case as
presented to these subjects heavily favored the
prosecution and that the subjects had difficulty
understanding the instructions regarding who had the
burden of proof.

These findings attenuate a conclusion

that the jury verdicts were not influenced by the
instructions and the applicable law as contained in
these instructions.
In the analysis of the individual dependent
measures there are some findings to suggest that the
different instructions influenced these measures in the
predicted direction.

Prior to deliberation there were

no differences among the jury instruction groups on
individual verdict decisions, but after deliberation
there were significantly more not guilty by reason of
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insanity verdicts when the burden was on the
prosecution to prove sanity beyond a reasonable doubt.
In an analysis of the individual responses to each
item on the insanity defense questionnaire, some
evidence suggests that who has the burden of proof and
the level of that proof influences the jurors'
attitudes towards the defendant's insanity plea.
Placing the burden on the prosecution to prove sanity
beyond a reasonable doubt resulted in significantly
greater endorsement of the notion that the defendant is
not morally responsible for his behavior, and that he
should be in a hospital rather than a prison.

These

results are consistent with the findings of Homant and
Kennedy (1987) who found that an association existed
between who has the burden to prove sanity/insanity and
attitudes towards the insanity defense.
are also similar to that of Kerr et al.

The results
(1976) in that

the most stringent standard for the prosecution results
in the more favorable findings for the defendant.
The jurors did not increase their comprehension by
participating in the deliberation process.

This result

can partially be explained by the large number of
guilty verdicts, which in many cases rendered
discussion unnecessary when all the subjects agreed on
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the verdict immediately.

Possibly the high agreement

in verdicts increased the subject's confidence that
they comprehended the law as it was to be applied to
the facts and decreased the need to,reassess their
knowledge at the second administration of the
comprehension questionnaire.
It has been concluded that groups tend to recall
and recognize information better than individuals
(Volarth, Sheppard, Hinsz & Davis, 1989).

But this

finding may be limited to situations where there is an
actual decision making process allowing the group to
check errors of the individual.

Therefore, the nature

of the task impacts the decision making process and
thereby influences the ability of the group dynamic to
increase accuracy in recall.

In this study many jury's

faced the task only of determining if there was a group
consensus and upon finding such a consensus their task
was complete.

This is different from a situation where

the problem to be solved requires an exchange of
information between individuals regarding how and why
they arrived at a decision.

Possibly future research

could be undertaken to require the jurors to complete
comprehension questionnaires as part of their
deliberation process.
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Though attempts were made to increase the external
validity of the experiment by videotaping a mock trial
based on an actual case, not all aspects of a real
trial could be replicated.

One important difference

between the videotape and an actual trial concerns the
attorneys' use of the burden issues when presenting a
case before an actual jury.

Adversarial techniques

suggest that when an opposing party has a heavy burden
of proof issue, it can be advantageously used in
arguments to the jury, especially in closing
statements.

This is particularly effective for the

defense when the prosecution has the burden to prove an
issue beyond a reasonable doubt.

Due to experimental

constraints this was not done on the videotape.

Based

on the findings of Cruse and Brown (1987), that it is
not the timing of the instructions but the amount of
times they are given, videotaping may have diluted the
impact of the instructions.
Overall it does not seem that the jurors fully
comprehended the jury instructions particularly with
regard to who has the burden of proof and what is the
level of proof.

Of particular concern is that those

subjects who were in the condition requiring the
prosecution to prove sanity gave significantly more
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wrong answers on the question regarding this burden
than those subjects in the condition requiring the
defense to prove insanity.

Furthermore, those subjects

that were in the instruction condition requiring the
prosecution to prove sanity most frequently said it was
the defense that was required to prove insanity.

This

finding supports the idea that possibly once the jurors
made up their mind that the defendant was guilty they
were not attuned to information that may have been
contrary to their hypotheses about the defendant.

This

is consistent with social cognition research that
suggests that people have a tendency to gather
information about others in ways that confirm their
beliefs about that person.

Pyszcznski and Greenberg

(1987) suggest that even though accuracy is considered
to be an important goal it is not the only goal that
may be motivating an individual in arriving at an
attribution.
/

The instructions used were pattern jury
instructions.

These are the types of instructions that

Severance & Loftus (1982) have found to be difficult to
understand.

The findings from this study confirm the

previous findings about the difficulty subjects have in
understanding the instructions, particularly
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instructions concerning burden of proof issues.

The

most frequently missed question concerned who had the
burden of proof and the meaning of the level of proof
(Severance & Loftus, 1982; Kerr et al., 1976).

These

findings are also consistent with Dane's (1985)
conclusion that the concept of reasonable doubt is a
difficult concept for juries to comprehend and to apply
effectively in their decision making process.
Group deliberation did not significantly effect
decisions regarding guilt and therefore this study does
not offer confirming evidence for the group
polarization effect suggested by McGuire, Keisler, and
Siegel (1987).

The lack of a significant finding may

be due to the high number of guilty verdicts in the
initial decision process.

But the findings are

supportive of the group polarization effect because
there were more guilty verdicts after deliberation than
before deliberation. The average of the individual's
preferences after deliberation moved more to the pole
that the majority of the individuals preferred prior to
deliberation.

This is also consistent with the social

decision scheme model proposed by Davis (1973) which
predicts that the verdict preferred by a clear majority
of jurors at the outset of deliberation is likely to be
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chosen as the group's final verdict.
This may reflect the normative influence process
that jurors use to resolve initial differences (Deutsch
& Gerard, 1955).

Because of the large number of guilty

verdicts before deliberation the number of not guilty
f

verdicts in each jury was relatively small.

Therefore,

the not guilty verdicts were generally influenced to
reach a consensus by changing their vote to guilty.
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Table 1
Distribution of Jury Verdicts bv Instruction

Guilty

Not Guilty

Prosecution
Reasonable Doubt

3

3

Clear & Convincing

4

2

Clear & Convincing

6

0

Reasonable Doubt

5

1

Defense

Total

18

6
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Table 2
Distribution of Individual Verdicts Before and After
Deliberation

Guilty

Not Guilty

Prosecution
Reasonable Doubt
Before

26

9

After

25

10*

Before

29

3

After

34

0

Clear & Convincing

Defense
Clear & Convincing
Before

29

5

After

34

0

Before

28

5

After

29

4

Reasonable Doubt

*After deliberation there were significantly more not
guilty by reason of insanity verdicts when the burden
was on the prosecution to prove insanity beyond a
reasonable doubt.
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Table 3
F ratios for the IPO on the 2 (level of proof) x 2
(burden of proof) repeated measure ANOVA.
IDQ(l)

IDQ(2)

IDQ(3) IDQ(4) IDQ(5)

IDQ(6)

Burden

1.40

1.80

0.10

0.01

0.90

1.55

Level

1.02

0.01

5.47*

1.82

0.16

2.52

Burd x Lev

4.30*

0.23

1.71

1.00

0.63

5.34*

Time

0.20

2.44

0.01

0.00

0.02

0.71

Burden x
Time

0.87

1.84

0.53

0.69

0.11

2.91

Level x
Time

0.01

5.22*

0.24

0.35

0.80

0.02

Burd x Lev
x Time

0.03

0.02

0.88

1.01

2.94

0.02

Between

Within

p < .05
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Table 4
Mean Scores on the IDO Before and After Deliberation bv
Instruction

IDQ(1)

IDQ(2)

IDQ(3)

IDQ(4)

Prosecution
Reasonable
Doubt

3.89/3.83

2.97/2.63

3.54/3.51

3.69/3.66

Clear and
Convincing

4.36/4.29

2.90/2.87

4.16/4.07

4.10/4.00

IDQ(1)

IDQ(2)

I D Q (3)

IDQ(4)

Defense
Reasonable
Doubt

4.33/4.36

3.18/3.03

3.82/3.76

3.85/3.79

Clear and
Convincing

4.16/4.24

2.97/3.10

3.88/3.97

3.78/3.90

(table continues)
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Table 4
IDQ(5)

IDQ(6)

TOTAL

Prosecution
Reasonable
Doubt

3.80/4.66

3.17/2.97

21.05/20.60

Clear and
Convincing

4.26/3.97

3.87/3.71

23.78/23.25

IDQ(5)

IDQ(6)

TOTAL

Defense
Reasonable
Doubt

4.24/4.18

3.70/3.76

23.09/23.06

Clear and
Convincing

4.06/4.18

3.56/3.61

22.48/23.11
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Table 5
Mean Number of Correct Answers out of seven on the
Comprehension Questionnaire Before and After
Deliberation

Before

After

Prosecution
Reasonable Doubt

3.68

3.71

Clear and Convincing

3.96

4.12

Reasonable Doubt

4.21

4 .12

Clear and Convincing

4.20

4.32

Defense
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Table 6
Distribution of Correct and Incorrect Answers to
Question 6 on the Comprehension Questionnaire
Incorrect

Correct

Prosecution
Reasonable Doubt

28

7

Clear and Convincing

23

9

Defense
Reasonable Doubt

3

30

Clear Convincing

7

27
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Table 7
ANCOVA Results for the IDQ with Scores on the IDQ
Before Deliberation as the Covariate
IDQ (1)
SS

Df

MS

F-Ratio

P

Level

.17

1

.17

.42

.52

Burden

.48

1

.47

1.16

.28

Lev x Burd

.21

1

.21

.52

.47

Source

IDQ ( 2 )
Level
Burden
Lev x Burd

.77

1

.77

1.49

.23

1.15

1

1.15

2.43

.12

.06

1

.06

.12

.73

IDQ(3)
Level

.77

1

.77

1.49

.23

Burden

.01

1

.01

.02

.88

Lev x Burd

.20

1

.20

.39

.54

IDQ(4)
Level

.75

1

.75

1.64

.20

Burden

.02

1

.02

.05

.82

Lev x Burd

.05

1

.05

.12

.73

(table contii
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IDQ(5)
Level

.24

1

.24

.20

.66

Burden

.36

1

.36

.30

.59

Lev x Burd

.01

1

.01

.01

.95

IDQ(61
Level
Burden
Lev x Burd

.06

1

.00

.00

.07

1.63

1

1.63

3 .34

.07

.96

1

.96

1.98

.16

IDO ( TOTAL)
Level

1.43

1

1.43

.16

.70

Burden

5.76

1

5.76

.63

.43

Lev x Burd

4.06

1

4.06

.44

.51
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Appendix A
CHAP.GE
Jeff Arnold is indicted for the federal crime of
kidnapping and use of a firearm.
DEFENSE
Defendant raises the defense of insanity.

There

is not much dispute as to the facts surrounding the
crime.
APPLICABLE LAW
The insanity defense is asserted by Mr. Arnold as
his only defense.

Basically, most of the facts

regarding the crime are agreed upon by both sides.
federal law defines insanity as the following:
The test is a two-pronged test:

(1)

the

defendant must have a severe mental disease
or defect.

If there Is no such mental

disease or defect you need not consider the
second prong;

(2) Because of the mental

disease or defect, the defendant must not
have been able to appreciate the nature and
quality of his acts or the wrongfulness of
his acts.

The
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FACTUAL SUMMARY
1.

Jeff Arnold and Barbara Shore begin a

romantic relationship in 1983 while both working
at a TV station.
2.

In 1984 relationship stops because Barbara

changes jobs.
3.

Relationship resumes in 198 6.

Jeff Arnold is married to someone else for

most of relationship.

In August 1986 he says he

will get a divorce and marry Barbara.
surprised by this.

Barbara is

Relationship stops.

4.

February 1987- relationship resumes.

5.

May 1988- Barbara accepts job in Richmond,

and Jeff accepts job in D.C.

Jeff helps Barbara

move into her new apartment and ends up staying
there.
6.

Barbara's parents find out Jeff is living

with Barbara and that he is married to Susan.
They get upset, call Barbara and suggest she break
up with Jeff.
7.

November 1988- Jeff gets a divorce from Susan

and asks Barbara to marry him.
yes, and then declines.

She first says
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8.

November 1988- Barbara's father has heart

attack and Barbara goes to parent's house to help
mother.

Barbara does not want to see Jeff, but he

comes to her parent's house and causes a
disturbance.
9.

The police are called.

Jeff tries to abduct Barbara in car so that

they can work their problems out.

Barbara agrees

to resume relationship so he will take her back
home.

She later calls him and tells him this was

not true.
10.

December 1988- Jeff has gun and meets Barbara

in parking lot.

Jeff tampered with car so she

could not escape.

A co-worker rescued her.

11.

Barbara gets restraining order.

12.

New Year's Eve Jeff abducts Barbara from

parent's home.

Very carefully planned out the

abduction: rigged truck, maps, food, handcuffs,
gun, climbs into attic and cuts hole in ceiling,
cuts telephone wires.

Cuts one alarm but another

is set off. He shakes when he breaks into house.
He carries a gun.
13.

Jeff expresses concern that police might
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follow so takes back roads.
going to Mexico.

Tells her they are

Has maps, Spanish translation

books.
14.

First night stays in N.C. hotel.

sexual advances and Barbara complies.

Jeff makes
She says it

is out of fear.
15.

Jeff allows Barbara to make phone calls

through which FBI locates them.

Jeff spends most

of time talking how he wants them to get back
together and that if only he could get her alone
away from her parents influence, everything will
be o.k.
16.

After being in jail for six months, and

Barbara has not visited him, Jeff still believes
that she has feelings for him.
17.

Jeff threatens suicide on their trip south.

He says if she won't be with him he'd rather die.
He had previously threatened suicide if Barbara
did not join him in D.C.
18.

Jeff goes through a serious depression after

Barbara refuses to marry him subsequent to his
divorce.
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19.

After Barbara returned the engagement ring

Jeff had given her she gave him a Christmas
present.

It was a pillow and a note attached

saying she loved him.
20.

Jeff had no history of any kind of violent or

anti-social behavior before 1983.

There was no

evidence of any psychopathology.
DEFENDANT'S CASE
- Defendant's expert Dr. Robert Close is a
psychiatrist at Norfolk Sentara Hospital and a
professor at EVMS medical school.
- He interviewed Jeff in September and October
1989 and reviewed other psychiatric reports,
including the staff at Federal Prison where Mr.
Arnold is being held.
report.

He also reviews Dr. Day's

Also reviews basis for opinion list.

1.

personal interviews (2).

2.

other psychiatric reports including

psychiatric prison reports and that of Dr.
Day.
3.

written letters/statements of defendant

including essay "About my love."
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4.

FBI reports:

interview with Jeff

Arnold, interview with Barbara Shore,
inventory of truck's contents, interview with
Patty Hark.
- Important that Jeff had no psychiatric problems
prior to 1983.
- Another important event:

call from Barbara's

parents voicing disapproval of the relationship.
This creates a great deal of tension.
- First indication of unrealistic behavior is his
jealousy.

Suspicious and possessive.

- After Barbara returned engagement ring- Jeff's
behavior was significant.

He strongly felt that

Barbara does love him and that her parents are
interfering with their relationship.

He believes

that she still loves him, but that she is unable
to express it because of interference of her
family.
- Clear change in Jeff's behavior when he tried to
abduct her from parking lot and road in December
1988:
- very depressed (symptoms- low mood, crying,
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difficulty with sleep, decreased energy.)
could think about was Barbara.

All he

Lost interest in

all usual activities.
- Jeff still felt Barbara loved him even after she
got a restraining order telling him to keep away
and lawyer calls him telling him to move out of
Barbara's apartment.

The same day he gets voter

registration certificate, so that he and Barbara
would have I.D. if they crossed Mexico border.
- At this point, Jeff is clearly delusioned.
is also suffering from a major depression.
persisted throughout December.
he had insomnia or hypersomnia.

He
This

He could not work,
He felt like life

was not worth living if Barbara was not with him.
He has delusions of persecution, jealousy and
erotomania and also the delusion that Barbara
loved him despite the evidence to the contrary.
- The delusion is that despite all the evidence to
the contrary, Jeff still believes Barbara loves
him.

He is so committed to this idea that he

would go to any length to try to get her with him.
He believed the world was doing him wrong by
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trying to keep them apart.

A delusion is a fixed

false belief.
- Three parts to the delusion:
1.

Barbara loved him despite contrary

evidence.
2.

That Barbara's parents were interfering

with her expression of her love.
3.

That her parents interference with their

relationship was wrong and dishonest and he
should do what he had to, to give their
relationship a chance.
- Even though Jeff knew what he was doing was
illegal, and he made great plans to avoid capture,
he thought what he was doing was right.
- Summary of psychiatric diagnosis:
1.

first evidence of disturbance is

pathological jealousy and excessive
possessiveness and suspicion.
2.

after Barbara leaves him he develops a

major depression.
3.

also has the paranoid delusion that

Barbara is in love with him and that other
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people are doing wrong by keeping them apart.
- At the time of offense he had a mental diseaseincluding a paranoid disorder with erotomania and
a major depressive reaction.
Erotomania:

a paranoid disorder whereby the

person has a delusion or a fixed false belief
that someone else is in love with him when
there is evidence to the contrary.

It is a

delusional disorder not associated with
hallucination or thought disturbance as seen
in paranoid schizophrenia.
- Even after his arrest, Jeff was making plans to
abduct Barbara.
Hark.

This plan was revealed to Patty

this shows delusional quality of his

thinking.
- He reconciles Jeff's trying to elude capture- by
saying that Jeff perceived he was doing the right
thing even though he knew it was illegal.

(At

time of report by Dr. Close, DSM III did not have
an erotomania category.

It has since been added.)

- Dr. Close agrees with Dr. Day that Jeff was
aware that other people thought what he was doing
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was illegal- but Dr. Close says Jeff himself
subjectively did not appreciate that what he was
doing was wrong.

Dr. Close distinguishes between

a legality and what is subjectively thought to be
right or wrong.
PROSECUTION'S CASE
- Dr. Day: Government's expert witness:
- credentials:

psychiatrist at Medical College of

Virginia and Professor of Psychiatry at Virginia
Commonwealth University.
- does not believe that defendant suffers from
erotomania for the following reasons:
- Barbara and Jeff had a genuine relationship.
Barbara had communicated to Jeff that she loved
him as late as November 1988.
- Jeff does not have a delusion that she loves
(

him.

Evidence exists that she does love him.

- Does not think erotomania should be diagnosed
after a relationship ends.
- It may be the defense mechanism of denial rather
than a delusion.
- Jeff suffered from no other delusion.

He did
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exhibit jealousy when they were living in Richmond
and when they moved back to Norfolk.

But this was

not delusional.
- Only evidence that makes him wonder whether Jeff
has erotomania is after his arrest when he has no
contact with Barbara he still believes Barbara has
no ill feelings towards him and that she may even
visit him in prison.
according to Dr. Day.

This is quite a distortion
But he says it does not

amount to a delusion because as recent as the
abduction, Barbara told him that she loved him
(even if it was said for her survival).

Dr. Day

calls this an unrealistic hope and not a delusion.
The unrealistic hope was not founded in
psychopathology, but in his love for Barbara.
- Jeff did not have any psychosis
- During the time he was depressed, his
functioning varied.
did not work.

This is characteristic of severely

depressed people.
quite well.

At times he slept all day and

At other times he functioned

He was functioning well when he

planned the first abduction.

He became depressed
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again after his plan failed.
- Jeff knew the nature and quality of his actions.
This is shown by his meticulous planning of the
alleged crime (disabling phone line and alarm at
Barbara's parent's house).
- This planning and these actions also show that
he appreciated the wrongfulness of his acts.

He

cut the phone lines and this shows he was thinking
ahead.
- Also Jeff told him that he experienced extreme
shaking when he cut the hole in attic roof.

This

emotional arousal showed that he realized
something bad may happen to him and that he
recognized what he was doing.

He therefore

appreciated the nature and quality of his actions.
- He was also aware that his actions were wrongful
which is evidenced by him disabling the phone
lines, taking a gun with him showed that he may
encounter resistance, taking back roads to avoid
detection.
- He knew what he was doing was wrong and that
Barbara did not want to go with her.

If he had
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erotomania he would have thought Barbara wanted to
go with him and he would not have had to use
force.
- He tells his mother on the phone during the
abduction that he is sorry he has hurt her, he
asks if FBI knows he has truck and what the
license

plate is.

All these show he appreciated

the wrongfulness of the crime.
- Jeff did not suffer from a mental disease or
defect at the time of the crime.
- Jeff did not have delusion that Barbara did not
want to be with him because of her parent's
objection.

This was not a delusion because it did

have some basis in fact.
- In Jeff's mind he thought if was proper for him
to abduct Barbara.

This is selfishness.

It does

not mean that he did not appreciate the
wrongfulness of his actions.
WHAT IS EROTOMANIA?
- Erotomania is a delusional disorder.

The main

feature is the delusion which is a fixed false
belief maintained in the face of contradictory
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evidence.
- These delusional disorders are uncommon and
difficult to treat.
- The DSM-III-R makes the presence of delusions in
the absence of schizophrenia, affective, or
organic illness the essential features of this
condition.
- Requirements:
1.

nonbizarre delusions (i.e. involving

situations that occur in real life- such as
being followed)
2.

auditory or visual hallucinations if

present are not prominent
3.

apart from the delusions, the behavior is

not bizarre.
4.

if major depressive or manic syndrome has

been present during the delusional
disturbance, the total duration of all
episodes of the mood syndrome has been brief
relative to the total duration of the
delusional disturbance.
5.

has never met criteria for schizophrenia,
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and if cannot be established that an organic
factor initiated and maintained the
disturbance.
- Specify type:

Erotomania- delusional disorder

in which the predominant theme of the delusion is
that a person, usually of a higher status is in
love with the subject.
- Freud referred to a male in formulating the
concept of erotomania but actually women more
freguently have the disorder.

The person fancies

that a famous man is in love
with her and therefore she with him.

She feels

that for reasons known only to the two of them,
the loved one cannot acknowledge this love openly.
She may pursue him but then be shocked by his
sexual advances, since sexual reality does not
usually fit into the fantasized scheme.
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Appendix B
Jury Instruction: Burden of Proof on Defendant to prove
Insanity Beyond a Reasonable Doubt
Ladies and gentlemen of the jury I am now going to
read the instructions to you.

You will not receive a

copy of the instructions.
1.

You have now heard all the testimony in this

case and the argument of counsel.

It now becomes the

Court's duty to give you the law that should govern
your decision in this case.

The law applicable to this

case is given to you in all these instructions.
your duty to follow the instructions.
given to you orally as I am doing.

It is

They will be

Faithful

performance by you of your duties is vital to the
administration of justice.

It is your duty to

determine the facts and to determine them from the
evidence and the reasonable inferences arising from
such evidence, and in so doing you must not indulge in
guess work and speculation.

The opening and closing

statements of the attorneys are intended to help you in
understanding the evidence and applying the law, but
they are not evidence.

You must not be influenced in
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any degree by any personal feeling of sympathy for or
prejudice against any party to this suit, for each
party is entitled to the same fair and impartial
consideration.
2.

When the defendant asserts the defense of

insanity, then the burden to prove that insanity rests
with the defendant.

The defendant must assert that, he

cannot require the Government to prove that he is not
insane.

That burden is on the defendant to prove that

he is mentally incompetent as the instruction's define
here.
3.

The defendant has been charged in the

indictment with willfully and knowinginly

kidnapping

and abducting Barbara Shore in violation of Title 18,
United States Code, Section 1201.

He has also been

charged with unlawfully carrying a firearm in violation
of Title 18, United States Code, Section 924c.
4.

Unlawfully means contrary to the law, so to do

an act unlawfully means to do willfully something which
is contrary to the law.

An act is done willfully if it

is done voluntarily and intentionally and with specific
intent to do something the law forbids, that is to say
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with bad purpose either to disobey or to disregard the
law.

I am going to read the next two instructions to

you which have to do with the question of the issue of
insanity or wrongfulness.
5.

Under the defendant's plea of not guilty there

is an issue as to his sanity at the time of the alleged
offense.

The law does not hold a person criminally

accountable for his conduct while insane, since an
insane person is not capable of forming the intent
essential to the commission of a crime.

A defendant

is insane within the meaning of these instructions if
at the time of the commission of the acts constituting
the offense the defendant as a result of severe mental
disease or defect was unable to appreciate the nature
and quality of his acts or was unable to appreciate the
wrongfulness of his acts.

For the purpose of throwing

light upon the mental condition of the accused at the
time of the alleged offense the jury may consider
evidence of his mental state both before and after that
time.

The material issue, however, is whether the

defendant was sane or insane at the time of the alleged
criminal conduct.

Unless evidence is offered to the
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contrary, a defendant is presumed sane.

If, however,

you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
was insane as defined in these instructions, you may so
find on your verdict form.

A reasonable doubt is a

doubt based on reason and common sense- the kind of
doubt that would make a person hesitate to act.
6.

Wrongfulness as used in this instruction means

wrongfulness rather than criminal wrongfulness.

In

other words, if you find beyond a reasonable doubt that
defendant because of a mental disease or defect lacks
substantial capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of
his conduct, even if he knows his conduct to be
criminal, but so commits it because of a delusion that
was justified, then your verdict must be not guilty by
reason of insanity.
I want to take this opportunity to thank you
for your time and effort in the deliberation of this
matter.
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Appendix C
Jury Instruction; Burden of Proof on Defendant to prove
Insanity bv Clear and Convincing Evidence
Ladies and gentlemen of the jury I am now going to
read the instructions to you.

You will not receive a

copy of the instructions.
1.

You have now heard all the testimony in this

case and the argument of counsel.

It now becomes the

Court's duty to give you the law that should govern
your decision in this case.

The law applicable to this

case is given to you in all these instructions.
your duty to follow the instructions.
given to you orally as I am doing.

It is

They will be

Faithful

performance by you of your duties is vital to the
administration of justice.

It is your duty to

determine the facts and to determine them from the
evidence and the reasonable inferences arising from
such evidence, and in so doing you must not indulge in
guess work and speculation.

The opening and closing

statements of the attorneys are intended to help you in
understanding the evidence and applying the law, but
they are not evidence.

You must not be influenced in
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any degree by any personal feeling of sympathy for or
prejudice against any party to this suit, for each
party is entitled to the same fair and impartial
consideration.
2.

When the defendant asserts the defense of

insanity, then the burden to prove that insanity rests
with the defendant.

The defendant must assert that, he

cannot require the Government to prove that he is not
insane.

That burden is on the defendant to prove that

he is mentally incompetent as the instruction's define
here.
3.

The defendant has been charged in the

indictment with willfully and knowinginly

kidnapping

and abducting Barbara Shore in violation of Title 18,
United States Code, Section 1201.

He has also been

charged with unlawfully carrying a firearm in violation
of Title 18, United States Code, Section 924c.
4.

Unlawfully means contrary to the law, so to do

an act unlawfully means to do willfully something which
is contrary to the law.

An act is done willfully if it

is done voluntarily and intentionally and with specific
intent to do something the law forbids, that is to say
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with bad purpose either to disobey or to disregard the
law.

I am going to read the next two instructions to

you which have to do with the question of the issue of
insanity or wrongfulness.
5.

Under the defendant's plea of not guilty there

is an issue as to his sanity at the time of the alleged
offense.

The law does not hold a person criminally

accountable for his conduct while insane, since an
insane person is not capable of forming the intent
essential to the commission of a crime.

A defendant

is insane within the meaning of these instructions if
at the time of the commission of the acts constituting
the offense the defendant as a result of severe mental
disease or defect was unable to appreciate the nature
and quality of his acts or was unable to appreciate the
wrongfulness of his agts.

For the purpose of throwing

light upon the mental condition of the accused at the
time of the alleged offense the jury may consider
evidence of his mental state both before and after that
time.

The material issue, however, is whether the

defendant was sane or insane at the time of the alleged
criminal conduct.

Unless evidence is offered to the
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contrary, a defendant is presumed sane.

If, however,

you find by clear and convincing evidence that the
defendant was insane as defined in these instructions,
you may so find on your verdict form.

When a party has

the burden of proving an issue by clear and convincing
evidence, he must produce evidence that creates in your
mind a firm belief or conviction that he has proved the
issue.
6.

Wrongfulness as used in this instruction means

wrongfulness rather than criminal wrongfulness.

In

other words, if you find by clear and convincing
evidence that defendant because of a mental disease or
defect lacks substantial capacity to appreciate the
wrongfulness of his conduct, even if he knows his
conduct to be criminal, but so commits it because of a
delusion that was justified, then your verdict must be
not guilty by reason of insanity.
I want to take this opportunity to thank you
for your time and effort in the deliberation of this
matter.
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Appendix D
Jury Instruction: Burden on Prosecution. Beyond a
Reasonable Doubt
Ladies and gentlemen of the jury I am now going to
read the instructions to you.

You will not receive a

copy of the instructions.
1.

You have now heard all the testimony in this

case and the argument of counsel.

It now becomes the

Court's duty to give you the law that should govern
your decision in this case.

The law applicable to this

case is given to you in all these instructions.
your duty to follow the instructions.
given to you orally as I am doing.

It is

They will be

Faithful

performance by you of your duties is vital to the
administration of justice.

It is your duty to

determine the facts and to determine them from the
i

evidence and the reasonable inferences arising from
such evidence, and in so doing you must not indulge in
guess work and speculation.

The opening and closing

statements of the attorneys are intended to help you in
understanding the evidence and applying the law, but
they are not evidence.

You must not be influenced in
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any degree by any personal feeling of sympathy for or
prejudice against any party to this suit, for each
i

party is entitled to the same fair and impartial
consideration.
2.

The defendant has been charged in the

indictment with willfully and knowinginly

kidnapping

and abducting Barbara Shore in violation of Title 18,
United States Code, Section 1201.

He has also been

charged with unlawfully carrying a firearm in violation
of Title 18, United States Code, Section 924c.
3.

Unlawfully means contrary to the law, so to do

an act unlawfully means to do willfully something which
is contrary to the law.

An act is done willfully if it

is done voluntarily and intentionally and with specific
intent to do something the law forbids, that is to say
with bad purpose either to disobey or to disregard the
law.

I am going to read the next two instructions to

you which have to do with the question of the issue of
insanity or wrongfulness.
4.

Under the defendant's plea of not guilty there

is an issue as to his sanity at the time of the alleged
offense.

The law does not hold a person criminally

Insanity Defense

78
accountable for his conduct while insane, since an
insane person is not capable of forming the intent
essential to the commission of a crime.
The government must prove beyond a reasonable
doubt either that at the time of the offense charged,
the defendant did not have a mental disease or defect,
or that despite the mental disease or defect he had
substantial capacity both to appreciate the
wrongfulness of his conduct and to conform his conduct
to the requirements of the law.

A reasonable doubt is

a doubt based on reason and common sense- the kind of
doubt that would make a person hesitate to act.
For the purpose of throwing light upon the mental
condition of the accused at the time of the alleged
offense you may consider evidence of his mental state
both before and after that time.

The material issue,

however, is whether the defendant was sane or insane at
the time of the alleged criminal conduct.
5.

Wrongfulness as used in this instruction means

wrongfulness rather than criminal wrongfulness.

In

other words, the defendant may have been aware that his
conduct was criminal, but in order for you to find him
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sane, you roust find beyond a reasonable doubt that he
w<as able to appreciate the wrongfulness of his actions.
I want to take this opportunity to thank you for
your time and effort in the deliberation of this
matter.
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Appendix E
Jury Instruction; Burden of Proof on Prosecution,
Clear and Convincing Evidence
Ladies and gentlemen of the jury I am now going to
read the instructions to you.

You will not receive a

copy of the instructions.
1.

You have now heard all the testimony in this

case and the argument of counsel.

It now becomes the

Court's duty to give you the law that should govern
your decision in this case.

The law applicable to this

case is given to you in all these instructions.
your duty to follow the instructions.
given to you orally as I am doing.

It is

They will be

Faithful

performance by you of your duties is vital to the
administration of justice.

It is your duty to

determine the facts and to determine them from the
evidence and the reasonable inferences arising from
such evidence, and in so doing you must not indulge in
guess work and speculation.

The opening and closing

statements of the attorneys are intended to help you in
understanding the evidence and applying the law, but
they are not evidence.

You must not be influenced in
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any degree by any personal feeling of sympathy for or
prejudice against any party to this suit, for each
party is entitled to the same fair and impartial
cons ideration.
2.

The defendant has been charged in the

indictment with willfully and knowinginly

kidnapping

and abducting Barbara Shore in violation of Title 18,
United States Code, Section 12 01.

He has also been

charged with unlawfully carrying a firearm in violation
of Title 18, United States Code, Section 924c.
3.

Unlawfully means contrary to the law, so to do

an act unlawfully means to do willfully something which
is contrary to the law.

An act is done willfully if it

is done voluntarily and intentionally and with specific
intent to do something the law forbids, that is to say
with bad purpose either to disobey or to disregard the
law.

I am going to read the next two instructions to

you which have to do with the question of the issue of
insanity or wrongfulness.
4.

Under the defendant's plea of not guilty there

is an issue as to his sanity at the time of the alleged
offense.

The law does not hold a person criminally
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accountable for his conduct while insane, since an
insane person is not capable of forming the intent
essential to the commission of a crime.
The government must prove by clear and convincing
evidence either that at the time of the offense
charged, the defendant did not have a mental disease or
defect, or that despite the mental disease of defect he
had substantial capacity both to appreciate the
wrongfulness of his conduct and to conform his conduct
to the requirements of the law.

When a party has the

burden of proving an issue by clear and convincing
evidence, he must produce evidence that creates in your
mind a firm belief or conviction that he has proved the
issue.
For the purpose of throwing light upon the mental
condition of the accused at the time of the alleged
offense the jury may consider evidence of his mental
state both before and after that time.

The material

issue, however, is whether the defendant was sane or
insane at the time of the alleged criminal conduct.
5.

Wrongfulness as used in this instruction means

wrongfulness rather than criminal wrongfulness.

In
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other words, the defendant may have been aware that his
conduct was criminal, but in order for you to find him
sane, you must find by clear and convincing evidence
that he was able to appreciate the wrongfulness of his
actions.
I want to take this opportunity to thank you for
your time and effort in the deliberation of this
matter.
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Appendix F
Insanity Defense Questionnaire
Sex ______

ID______

Instructions:

Please indicate on the line to the left

of each question a number indicating your attitude
towards the defendant's insanity defense plea in the
hypothetical case.
Scale:

1

2

3

(strongly agree)
1.

4

5
(strongly disagree)

The defendant is morally responsible for his
behavior.

2.

The defendant should be sentenced to prison
for a long time.

3.

The defendant's behavior indicated a high
probability of insanity.

4.

It is very likely that the defendant's
behavior was the direct result of a belief
system reflecting a severe mental illness.

5.

The defendant should not be held criminally
responsible for his behavior.

6.

The defendant should be in a psychiatric
hospital rather than a prison.
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Appendix G
Sex

ID

In the United States District Court
for the College of William and Marv

United States of America
Plaintiff,
vs.

At Law No.

89-C

John Doe,
Defendant.

Verdict Form
Based on full consideration of the evidence I find
(check one)

________

The defendant is not guilty by reason of

insanity.

The defendant is guilty of the offense(s) as
charged.
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Appendix H
Sex _____

ID_______
Comprehension Questionnaire

Instructions :

Based on your understanding of the

insanity defense, please place the letter corresponding
to the correct statement on the line to the left of
each numbered question.
_____ 1.

Which of the following statement(s) would
necessarily be true if a defendant was found
guilty by reason of insanity?
a.

The defendant was unable to appreciate

the wrongfulness of his acts at the time of
the offense and was unable to assist inhis
own defense at the time of trial.
b.

The defendant has a long history of

mental illness and the predominant medical
evidence indicates his illness will not
improve.
c.

The defendant was incapable of forming

the intent required for commission of the
crime.
d.

Both b and c.
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2.

Which evidence below could be considered when
evaluating the defendant's insanity plea?
a.

The prior planning engaged in by

defendant in preparation for the criminal
act.
b.

The testimony of family members regarding

the defendant's bizarre behavior shortly
after commission of the crime.
c.

Psychiatric opinion testimony regarding

the defendant's mental state at the time of
the crime.
d.
3.

All of the above.

Which of the following would be the material
issue in evaluating the defendant's insanity
plea?
a.

The defendant's sanity or insanity at the

time of the alleged offense.
b.

Whether the defendant was actually guilty

of the offense charged.
c.

Whether the prosecution and defense

expert psychiatric witnesses agreed upon the
defendant's state of mind.
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d.

Both a and b.

Which of the following statements is most
consistent with the legal definition of
insanity?
a.

The defendant was psychotic at the time

of the crime.
b.

The defendant was justifiably enraged by

a situation and could not control his
impulses at the time of the crime.
c.

The defendant was mentally ill and

because of his illness could not appreciate
the fact that his criminal act was wrong.
d.

The defendant was unable to appreciate

the nature and quality of his acts and was
unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of his
acts.
Which of the following defendants will most
likely be acquitted by reason of insanity?
a.

Mr. A because although he knew it was

wrong to shoot the crossing guard, he was
laboring under a delusion that the crossing
guard was actually the devil.
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b.

Mr. B because he has been severely

mentally ill most of his life and because of
his mental illness he thought he was
squeezing a lemon but actually he was
strangling his wife.
c.

Mr. C because when he saw a driver

deliberately run over his dog Fido, he lost
all control of his impulses and struck the
driver with a baseball bat.
d.

All of the above.

Which of the following is true about the
insanity defense?
a.

Sanity is an element of the crime and

must be proven by the government.
b.

Insanity at the time of the crime must be

proven by the defense.
(

c.

The government must show sanity at the

time of the trial and the defendant must show
insanity at the time of the offense.
d.

None of the above.

The concept of reasonable doubt as applied to
the insanity defense is consistent with which
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of the following statements?
a.

A reasonable doubt is doubt based on an

individual's common sense.
b.

If a juror has a doubt based on reason

that the defendant was sane at the time of
the offense, the juror should vote to acquit
the defendant.
c.

If the evidence more likely than not

indicates that the defendant was sane at the
time of the offense, the government has met
its burden to show the defendant was sane at
the time of the crime.
d.

Both a and b.
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Appendix I
Sex ______

ID______
Comprehension Questionnaire

Instructions:

Based on your understanding of the

insanity defense please place the letter corresponding
to the correct statement on the line to the left of
each numbered question.
_____ 1.

Which of the following statement(s) would
necessarily be true if a defendant was found
guilty by reason of insanity?
a.

The defendant was unable to appreciate

the wrongfulness of his acts at the time of
the offense and was unable to assist inhis
own defense at the time of trial.
b.

The defendant has a long history of

mental illness and the predominant medical
evidence indicates his illness will not
improve.
c.

The defendant was incapable of forming

the intent required for commission of the
crime.
d.

Both b and c.
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2.

Which evidence below could be considered when
evaluating the defendant's insanity plea?
a.

The prior planning engaged in by

defendant in preparation for the criminal
act.
b.

The testimony of family members regarding

the defendant's bizarre behavior shortly
after commission of the crime.
c.

Psychiatric opinion testimony regarding

the defendant's mental state at the time of
the crime.
d.
3.

All of the above.

Which of the following would be the material
issue in evaluating the defendant's insanity
plea?
a.

The defendant's sanity or insanity at the

time of the alleged offense.
b.

Whether the defendant was actually guilty

of the offense charged.
c.

Whether the prosecution and defense

expert psychiatric witnesses agreed upon the
defendant's state of mind.
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d.

Both a and b.

Which of the following statements is most
consistent with the legal definition of
insanity?
a.

The defendant was psychotic at the time

of the crime.
b.

The defendant was justifiably enraged by

a situation and could not control his
impulses at the time of the crime.
c.

The defendant was mentally ill and

because of his illness could not appreciate
the fact that his criminal act was wrong.
d.

The defendant was unable to appreciate

the nature and quality of his acts and was
unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of his
acts.
Which of the following defendants will most
likely be acquitted by reason of insanity?
a.

Mr. A because although he knew it was

wrong to shoot the crossing guard, he was
laboring under a delusion that the crossing
guard was actually the devil.
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b.

Mr. B because he has been severely

mentally ill most of his life and because of
his mental illness he thought he was
squeezing a lemon but actually he was
strangling his wife.
c.

Mr. C because when he saw a driver

deliberately run over his dog Fido, he lost
all control of his. impulses and struck the
driver with a baseball bat.
d.

All of the above.

Which of the following is true about the
insanity defense?
a.

Sanity is an element of the crime and

must be proven by the government.
b.

Insanity at the time of the crime must be

proven by the defense.
c.

The government must show sanity at the

time of the trial and the defendant must show
insanity at the time of the offense.
d.

None of the above.

If the prosecution has proven sanity at the
time of offense by clear and convincing
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evidence, this means which of the following?
a.

The prosecution has countered all

reasonable arguments by the defense.
b.

The jurors have little doubt that the

defendant was sane at the time of the crime.
c.

The jurors on balance believe the

prosecution's expert psychiatric testimony
over the defendant's psychiatric testimony
regarding the defendant's sanity at the time
of the offense.
d.

The prosecution has created a firm belief

in the juror's minds that the defendant was
sane at the time of the offense.
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Appendix J
Sex _____

ID______
Comprehension Questionnaire

Instructions:

Based on your understanding of the

insanity defense please place the letter corresponding
to the correct statement on the line to the left of
each numbered question.
_____ 1.

Which of the following statement(s) would
necessarily be true if a defendant was found
guilty by reason of insanity?
a.

The defendant was unable to appreciate

the wrongfulness of his

acts at the time of

the offense and was unable to assist inhis
own defense at the time of trial.
b.

The defendant has a long history of

mental illness and the predominant medical
evidence indicates his illness will not
improve.
c.

The defendant was incapable of forming

the intent required for commission of the
crime.
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d.

Both b and c.

Which evidence below could be considered when
evaluating the defendant's insanity plea?
a.

The prior planning engaged in by

defendant in preparation for the criminal
act.
b.

The testimony of family members regarding

the defendant's bizarre behavior shortly
after commission of the crime.
c.

Psychiatric opinion testimony regarding

the defendant's mental state at the time of
the crime.
d.

All of the above.

Which of the following would be the material
issue in evaluating the defendant's insanity
plea?
a.

The defendant's sanity or insanity at the

time of the alleged offense.
b.

Whether the defendant was actually guilty

of the offense charged.
c.

Whether the prosecution and defense

expert psychiatric witnesses agreed upon the
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defendant's state of mind,
d.
4.

Both a and b.

Which of the following statements is most
consistent with the legal definition of
insanity?
a.

The defendant was psychotic at the time

of the crime.
b.

The defendant was justifiably enraged by

a situation and could not control his
impulses at the time of the crime.
c.

The defendant was mentally ill and

because of his illness could not appreciate
the fact that his criminal act was wrong.
d.

The defendant was unable to appreciate

the nature and quality of his acts and was
unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of his
acts.
5.

Which of the following defendants will most
likely be acquitted by reason of insanity?
a.

Mr. A because although he knew it was

wrong to shoot the crossing guard, he was
laboring under a delusion that the crossing
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guard was actually the devil.
b.

Mr. B because he has been severely

mentally ill most of his life and because of
his mental illness he thought he was
squeezing a lemon but actually he was
strangling his wife.
c.

Mr. C because when he saw a driver

deliberately run over his dog Fido, he lost
all control of his impulses and struck the
driver with a baseball bat.
d.

All of the above.

Which of the following is true about the
insanity defense?
a.

Sanity is an element of the crime and

must be proven by the government.
b.

Insanity at the time of the crime must be

proven by the defense.
c.

The government must show sanity at the

time of the trial and the defendant must show
insanity at the time of the offense.
d.

None of the above.

If a defendant has proven insanity by clear
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and convincing evidence this means which of
the following?
a.

He has countered all reasonable arguments

by the prosecution regarding the defendant's
insanity plea.
b.

The jurors have little doubt that the

defendant was insane at the time of the
crime.
c.

The jurors on balance believe the

defendant's expert psychiatric testimony over
the government's psychiatric testimony
regarding the defendant's sanity at the time
of the crime.
d.

The defendant has created a firm belief

in the jurors' minds that he was insane at
the time of the crime.
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Appendix K
Sex ______

ID_____
Comprehension Questionnaire

Instructions:

Based on your understanding of the

insanity defense from the information you have heard,
please place the letter corresponding to the correct
statement on the line to the left of each numbered
question.
_____ 1.

Which of the following statement(s) would
necessarily be true if a defendant was found
guilty by reason of insanity?
a.

The defendant was unable to appreciate

the wrongfulness of his acts at the time of
the offense and was unable to assist inhis
own defense at the time of trial.
b.

The defendant has a long history of

mental illness and the predominant medical
evidence indicates his illness will not
improve.
c.

The defendant was incapable of forming

the intent required for commission of the
crime.

Insanity Defense

102

d.

Both b and c.

Which evidence below could be considered when
evaluating the defendant's insanity plea?
a.

The prior planning engaged in by

defendant in preparation for the criminal
act.
b.

The testimony of family members regarding

the defendant's bizarre behavior shortly
after commission of the crime.
c.

Psychiatric opinion testimony regarding

the defendant's mental state at the time of
the crime.
d.

All of the above.

Which of the following would be the material
issue in evaluating the defendant's insanity
plea?
a.

The defendant's sanity or insanity at the

time of the alleged offense.
b.

Whether the defendant was actually guilty

of the offense charged.
c.

Whether the prosecution and defense

expert psychiatric witnesses agreed upon the
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defendant's state of mind,
d.

Both a and b.

Which of the following statements is most
consistent with the legal definition of
insanity?
a.

The defendant was psychotic at the time

of the crime.
b.

The defendant was justifiably enraged by

a situation and could not control his
impulses at the time of the crime.
c.

The defendant was mentally ill and

because of his illness could not appreciate
the fact that his criminal act was wrong.
d.

The defendant was unable to appreciate

the nature and quality of his acts and was
unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of his
acts.
Which of the following defendants will most
likely be acquitted by reason of insanity?
a.

Mr. A because although he knew it was

wrong to shoot the crossing guard, he was
laboring under a delusion that the crossing
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guard was actually the devil.
b.

Mr. ,B because he has been severely

mentally ill most of his life and because of
his mental illness he thought he was
squeezing a lemon but actually he was
strangling his wife.
c.

Mr. C because when he saw a driver

deliberately run over his dog Fide, he lost
all control of his impulses and struck the
driver with a baseball bat.
d.

All of the above.

Which of the following is true about the
insanity defense?
a.

Sanity is an element of the crime and

must be proven by the government.
b.

Insanity at the time of the crime must be

proven by the defense.
c.

The government must show sanity at the

time of the trial and the defendant must show
insanity at the time of the offense.
d.

None of the above.

Which of the following is true regarding a
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defendant's insanity plea?
a.

The defense is an affirmative defense„

b.

The defendant is presumed sane unless the

defendant brings forth evidence to the
contrary.
c.

A reasonable doubt is based on reason and

common sense.
d.

All of the above.
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Appendix L
Sex: Male______

Female______ (indicate how many in

your jury)
Group Jury Number:

______

In the United States District Court
for the College of William and Mary
United States of America
Plaintiff,
vs.

At Law No.

G-

Jeff Arnold
Defendant
Verdict Form
Based on full consideration of the evidence we,
the jury find unanimously that (check one):
__________ The defendant is not guilty by reason
of insanity.
__________ The defendant is guilty of the
offense(s) as

charged.

__________ We are unable to reach a unanimous
verdict in
this matter.

Insanity Defense

107
Appendix M
Participant Number:
Sex:

Male____

______

Female ___

Group Jury Number:__ ______
1.

Please indicate how you voted as a member of the

jury.
______ The defendant is not guilty by reason of
insanity.
______ The defendant is guilty of the offense(s)
as charged.
2.

Was this the same conclusion you reached when you

filled out
the first verdict form?
______ Yes
______ No
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Figure 1
Mean score on IDO(l^* as a function of level of proof
and burden of proof.
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Figure 2
Mean score on 100(2^* as a function of time and level
of proof.
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Figure 3
Mean score on IPO(6)* as a function of level of proof
and burden of proof.
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